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CASES NOTED
stituted Court" approving the positions of Oregon and Louisiana would
not be totally unexpected. The essence of our criminal justice system
hinges on a verdict of guilty by the entire jury based on proof beyond
any reasonable doubt. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of Apodaca,
this writer maintains that in criminal trials, the prosecution must not
only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury as a whole, but
must make that showing to each individual juror. If any juror does not
believe that the defendant is guilty, a verdict of guilty cannot be rendered,
and rather than convict a defendant when such doubt exists, a retrial
should be ordered. Any other standard would lessen the responsibility
placed on the prosecution for a conviction by the burden of proof re-
quired, and the presumption of innocence would be fatally weakened.
It is therefore submitted that the unanimity rule for criminal jury verdicts
is not merely an historical antique, but is a necessity for a fair trial.
RAYMOND M. SEIDLER
WILL CONTESTS: THE SHIFTING BURDENS OF PROOF
Petitioners were lineal descendants, who had not been included in
their mother's will. They contested probate of the will on the grounds
that the testamentary instrument had been obtained as a result of the
exercise of undue influence by their sister, the sole beneficiary. The
county judge found that a "confidential relationship" existed between
mother and daughter and that the daughter actively procured the will.
Consequently, the judge ruled that a presumption of undue influence
arose and that the burden of proof shifted to the daughter, requiring her
to prove that there was no undue influence. The court then found that
the daughter's evidentiary showing was insufficient to carry the burden of
proof necessary to rebut the presumption and refused to admit the will
to probate. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the
county judge and held that the raising of a presumption of undue influ-
ence did not shift the burden of proof to the proponent of the will. Ac-
cording to the Fourth District, the daughter was only required to intro-
duce "credible evidence" to rebut the presumption; once such evidence
was introduced, the presumption and the persuasiveness of its support-
ing evidence disappeared. Having determined that the presumption failed
and after reviewing the other remaining evidence in the record, the court
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of undue
influence as a matter of law.1 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida
38. At the time of the writing of this Note, Mr. Justice Harlan and the late Mr.
Justice Black announced their resignations to the Supreme Court, and since that time
President Nixon has appointed two new Justices to the Court including William Rehnquist.
1. In re Carpenter, 239 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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affirmed in part the holding of the Fourth District and held: When a
presumption of undue influence is raised, only the burden of production
is shifted, not the burden of persuasion, and that presumption is neutral-
ized when the proponent presents a reasonable explanation for his active
role in the preparation of a will. At the same time, the supreme court
overruled the holding of the district court of appeal regarding the effect
of evidence once a presumption is rebutted and held: Even when a pre-
sumption of undue influence is rebutted, the evidence which supported
the rebutted presumption does not disappear; such evidence will still be
available to support an inference of undue influence. Consequently, what
constitutes a confidential relationship and undue influence in any partic-
ular situation is a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact,
not by the appellate courts. In re Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971).
The use of the ambiguous statement, a presumption shifts the bur-
den of proof, continues to cause judicial confusion since the term, burden
of proof, often conveys a double meaning in Florida.2 The instant deci-
sion reflects the view that the burden of persuasion remains with the
complainant while only the burden of production shifts from one party
to the other during trial. Under this view, the presumption does not re-
lieve the complainant of the burden of persuasion. Rather, it merely
transfers the burden of production to the opposing party once a presump-
tion has arisen in favor of the complainant.3
While the general rule is that a presumption does not shift the bur-
den of persuasion, Florida courts have "created an exception to the
general rule . .. applicable only to will contests."4 This exception has
been applied despite the contrary language of Florida Statutes section
2. In re Ziy, 223 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1969), quoting Alabama G.S. R.R. v. Hill, 34 Ala.
App. 466, 468, 43 So.2d 136, 137 (1949) [citing "Shifting of Burden," 10 R.C.L. 897, § 45]:
The term "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings. By the one is meant the
duty of establishing a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as
the law demands in the case in which the issue arises; by the other is meant the
duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of the trial,
in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, the burden of
proof, in the sense of the duty of producing evidence, passes from party to party as
the case progresses, while the burden of proof [production], meaning the obligation
to establish the truth of the claim by a preponderance of evidence, rests through-
out upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue, and unless he meets this
obligation upon the whole case he fails.
3. In re Ziy, 223 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1969).
4. In re Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697, 703 (Fla. 1971). This statement, however, is not
entirely correct. This exception has been applied in situations other than will contests where
parties share a confidential or fiduciary relationship. A majority of jurisdictions, including
Florida, have applied the exception in cases involving transactions between corporate of-
ficials and the corporations they represent. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939);
Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1934); Chipola Valley Realty
Co. v. Griffin, 94 Fla. 1151, 115 So. 541 (1927); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.,
119 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960). A majority of jurisdictions also apply the except-
tion to transfers of inter vivos gifts between principal and fiduciary. See 38 Am. JUR. 2d
Gifts §§ 92-94 (1968), citing Amado v. Aguirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161 P.2d 117 (1945); Mc-
Donald v. Hewlett, 102 Cal. App. 2d 680, 228 P.2d 83 (1951). This is presently the law
in Florida. Adams v. Sanders, 139 Fla. 730, 191 So. 312 (1939); Lesperance v. Lesperance,
233 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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732.31 (1969).1 Under this exception, when a will contestant demon-
strated facts which raised a presumption of undue influence, there was
a shift of the burden of persuasion from the contestant to the proponent
of the will." The basis for this exception had apparently developed be-
cause of the nature of the relationship7 existing between a testator and a
beneficiary who had enjoyed a confidential relationship with the testator.
Despite concern for this special relationship, Carpenter has eliminated
this exception. Although the supreme court advanced a variety of rea-
sons for its decision, the desire for conceptual uniformity in the law of
presumptions was apparently the paramount consideration.
Notwithstanding the benefits to be derived from such uniformity,
the result in Carpenter may contravene public policy considerations
which demand that fiduciaries and confidants exercise good faith in their
dealings. Thus, fiduciaries who reap unusual profits as a result of their
confidential and privy status naturally arouse a degree of distrust. When
such suspicion arises, the better policy would require the fiduciary to
prove that the transaction was conducted in complete good faith.' These
critical public policy considerations appear to have been completely
ignored in the two appellate decisions in Carpenter since neither the
supreme court nor the district court of appeal cited even one case deal-
ing with a confidential or fiduciary relationship to support their holdings. 9
The "undue influence" exception (in will contests) was recently applied by the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Wrobble v. Walda, 217 So.2d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
Only a small minority of jurisdictions have applied this exception as Florida has done, and
Florida may have begun doing so by accident. At one time, the factors raising a presump-
tion of undue influence in inter vivos gift transfers and will preparations were identical,
and proof that the donee or primary beneficiary had a confidential or fiduciary relationship
with the donor or testator was sufficient to raise the presumption. The factors have re-
mained the same for inter vivos gift transfers, but in the case of wills, the requirement of
proof of active participation in preparation was added in the case of In re Aldrich, 148
Fla. 121, 3 So.2d 856 (1941). The similarity of factors would seem to indicate that the
effect given presumptions in inter vivos gift transfers was extended to situations where
undue influence was raised in connection with the preparation of a will.
5. FLA. STAT. § 732.31 (1969) provides:
In all proceedings contesting the validity of a purported will, whether before or
after such will is admitted to probate, the burden of proof, in the first instance,
shall be upon the proponent thereof to establish, prima facie, the format execution
and attestation thereof, whereupon the burden of proof shall shift to the contestant
to establish the facts constituting the grounds upon which the probate of such
purported will is opposed or revocation thereof is sought. (Emphasis added.)
6. Consequently, the county judge in the instant case properly applied the body of
existing case law as it stood in Florida at the time he handed down his decision. See In re
Palmer, 48 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1950). But see FLA. STAT. § 732.31 (1969), supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Peacock v. Dubois, 90 Fla. 162, 105 So. 321 (1925) (transfer of a deed).
8. Marquette v. Hathaway, 76 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1954). The fiduciary proves the validity
of the transaction by showing
that the other party had competent and disinterested advice or that he performed
the act or entered into the transaction voluntarily, deliberately and advisedly, know-
ing its nature and effect, and that his consent was not obtained by the reason of
the power and influence to which the relationship might be supposed to give rise.
Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 197, 91 N.E. 1041, 1047 (1910),
quoting Uhlich v. Muhlke, 61 Ill. 499, 511 (1869).
9. See Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1965) and Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.2d 551
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The conclusion reached by the supreme court in Carpenter was cer-
tainly not the only alternative open to the court. Dean Wigmore, for one,
has balanced the vying considerations of public policy and uniform ap-
plication of the law of presumptions and developed a much more sensible
approach.'" This approach reconciles the special rule in will contests
which shifts the burden of persuasion to the proponent when an undue
influence presumption arises with the general rule which holds that the
burden of persuasion never shifts when a presumption is raised, only the
burden of production. Under the Wigmore approach, the proponent of
the will must establish all elements essential to its validity. Of course,
good faith is mandatory, and where the proponent of the will is a fidu-
ciary, he carries the burden of persuasion on that element.
Generally, for reasons of public policy, courts permit a presumption
of a will's validity to arise when it appears from evidence presented that
the will has been properly executed. Such a presumption, however, rests
upon other presumptions including that of the testator's sanity and the
absence of undue influence, both essential to the validity of a will. These
initial presumptions shift only the burden of production to the will con-
testant. If a contestant produces evidence of insane acts by the testator
or of undue influence by the fiduciary, the presumption of validity is re-
butted. The proponent must then present positive evidence of the sanity
of the testator or the absence of undue influence because such proof is
essential to the validity of any will. Under this view, since the burden of
persuasion never shifts from the proponent of the will, he must produce
evidence to outweigh any evidence produced by the contestant.
Despite the insistence of the Supreme Court of Florida that pre-
sumptions do not shift the burden of persuasion, Carpenter gives pre-
cisely that effect to the statutory presumption of validity which arises as
soon as a will is shown to have been properly executed." This is a partic-
ularly novel position since ordinarily statutory presumptions have no
greater effect than court-created presumptions which serve only to shift
the burden of production. In fact, this was the holding in Leonetti v.
Boone,12 which interestingly enough was cited as primary authority in
(Fla. 1954) (statutory presumption that person driving a car does so with the owner's
consent); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So.2d 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (pre-
sumption of natural death rather than suicide) ; Seaboard A.L. R.R. v. Lake Region Packing
Ass'n, 211 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th Dist., 1968); Shaw v. York, 187 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966) (presumption of negligence in rear end auto collision); Locke v. Stuart, 113 So.2d
402 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959) (presumption of validity of tax deed).
10. See J. WIcmORE, Wi0MoIE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2502-03 (3d ed. 1940); J. WIGMORE,
A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 453-54 (1935).
11. In re Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697, 702-04 (Fla. 1971), citing FLA. STAT. § 732.31 (1969).
12. 74 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954). In this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted
language from 20 AM. JUR. Evidence § 133 (1939), stating:
Statutes of the various states contain numerous enactments creating or declaring
presumptions or specifying that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence
of other facts, the effect of which is to relieve the party in whose favor they operate
of the necessity of producing evidence upon an issue and cast upon the other party
the burden of going forward with the evidence. They do not, however, shift the
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Carpenter. Nevertheless, the Carpenter court viewed the statute and its
legislative history as intending to place the burden of proving the non-
admissibility of a will to probate on the contestant.
13
While the statutory construction appears to do no more than require
the contestant to prove the affirmative of his proposition, in reality it has
a much greater effect. Now, the contestant must raise his objections to
the will in a fashion similar to pleading an affirmative defense. This is a
peculiar development since the will contestant is not seeking to avoid the
effect of a valid testamentary instrument by alleging undue influence in
the same fashion that a tortfeasor seeks to avoid liability by pleading con-
tributory negligence. Rather, the will contestant is directly challenging
the validity of the instrument.
The supreme court, however, justifies its result in Carpenter by stat-
ing that the decision will lend
greater credence to the traditional view in Florida that a prop-
erly executed will should be given effect unless it clearly ap-
pears that the free use.., of the testator's sound mind ... was
in fact prevented by deception, undue influence or other
means.'
4
Perhaps the need for certainty and respect for a testator's intent should
override the potential concern for overreaching by fiduciaries or confi-
dants in will preparations. Even so, courts advocating the desirability of
adopting a presumption of validity for testamentary instruments based
upon public policy considerations should not ignore those same considera-
tions as they relate to the exploitation of confidential relationships by
fiduciaries in will matters. It remains to be seen whether Carpenter will
be extended to other cases involving confidential relationships. Hope-
fully, though, the unique relationship of confidence and influence be-
tween certain parties which by its very nature militates for special treat-
ment and protection will again be recognized, and the present decision
will be limited to cases involving family relationships. In any event, fu-
ture changes in the law which apply to areas of public concern which
require as high a degree of protection as do probate matters should not
be made for the purpose of mere conceptual uniformity.
MICHAEL C. SPRING
burden of proof, but simply permit one to make a prima facie case in a way that
he could not make it without the statute. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 553.
13. In re Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697, 704 (Fla. 1971).
14. Id. (emphasis added by court).
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